The matter of ‘character’ that recently has become a social discussion topic is being pointed out as the reason for different social ills prevalent in the Korean society. Actually, education in Korea in the past has its limits as immersion education centered on tangible outcome and knowledge. That is, it is not the curriculum to raise true humans. Therefore, it would be very meaningful to find alternatives in Korean traditional education and analyze them. In particular, Yulgok's < Gyeokmongyogyeol > included the principles and methods of character education that can be applied to today's education in Korea. For example, ’Ipji(立志)’，what is most emphasized in < Gyeokmongyogyeol >, can be an essential educational method to maintain human life. In other words, in order to set an aim in life, the process of motivation is necessary, and this is the very factor that can be the driving force to recover flexibly from failure and frustration. It will be able to play its role as a key value for today's educational problems in Korea. For the children who don't know the reason to study, the process of motivation is a must. In this way, in < Gyeokmongyogyeol >, Yulgok stressed that as for the attitude for a novice scholar to have, one should set an aim at what one is going to do, do one's best at the work, and reflect oneself as the process of self-examination. Therefore, when the core values and methods of today's character education are to be established, the traditional educational principles in < Gyeokmongyogyeol > will be able to be an alternative to set the foundation of character education.

Constitutionalism in the West is a concept that appears with civil society. Therefore, it is not a concept that can be found in traditional Asian society. However, the substantive meaning of constitutionalism can be found in Confucian ideas. Confucianism realizes constitutionality through methods and systems of government. They sought to establish an objective system based on the natural order and the proven ruling system, and sought concrete measures for the benefit of the community. If the supreme power is abused, the power is controlled through a warning that the power can be changed. In this sense, the substantive content that constitutionalism seeks to pursue will be enough to be seen in the royal authority of Confucian ideas and the principle rule of Rites.

Will the human being can do wise choice? This is the familiar question when we discuss the future of civilization of relevance to the rapid development of science and technology. For the bright future of civilization, what are needed? We think the most important one is self-introspection of the human being. The focus of this paper is to find wisdom to open the bright future of civilization in the thought of Lao-tzu. In the thought of Lao-tzu, we can find the vision for freeing from anxiety and fear about the future and the bright future of civilization. In this paper, at the first we will examine the problems and the limitations of the modern society. Next, we will search for the vision in the dimensions of civilization, life, education, and the state through the thought of Lao-tzu. Finally, we will discuss the post-modern implications of the thought of Lao-tzu.

This paper is not an attempt to track the contents and features of the various theories of the “Four Pillars of Destiny (四柱, or Saju in Korean).” Rather, it is an attempt to infer why certain Saju theories appeared in certain eras. Tracking the formation and development of Saju theories, one realizes that they were logical reactions to the contemporary issues that tried to interpret and resolve them. Modern Saju theories attained their initial forms in the 60 year period of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (五代十國, A.D. 907-960) between the Tang (唐) and Song (宋) Dynasties. This was a period of confusion, when a countless number of military regimes vied for supremacy. Although the period of division was shorter than those of the Spring and Autume Period (春秋戰國) and the periods of Jin dynasty and Northern and Southern dynasties, productivity and population grew incomparably. Thus, there existed a stronger will of military heroes to win over the world. Anybody with a (military and financial) capacity and a little bit of luck could become a general and found a country. Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period was a period of typical “warlords” as such. “Warlords” and Yin-Yang scholars who advocated Saju naturally ended up requiring each other. The completion of Saju theories in the Song dynasty was possible thanks to Confucianism that the dynasty adopted as a ruling ideology. The meeting between Saju and Neo-Confucianism deserves a special credit. Dong Zhongshu from Han dynasty (漢）proposed the theory of “the unity of Heaven and Man” as a political ideology, linking Confucianism with the Yin-Yang theory. Neo-Confucianism is a new form of Confucianism regenerated by Chengzi and Zhu Xi. Neo-Confucianism defined Heaven (天) as a truth (理), and a truth (理)for Man was his/her nature(性).“The unity of Heaven and “The unity of Heaven and Man (天人合一)” was a unity of human morality (性, nature) and the laws (理)of the sky (nature). Neo-Confucianism could utilize Saju as great means, as it advocated that individuals and nations analogically (類比的) accumulated (體化）the general laws of nature. For this reason, not only Zhu Xi, a master of Neo-Confucianism, but also other contemporary Confucianists and men of noble family showed a deep interest in Saju. This fact can be confirmed from the fact that Saju theories did not develop as much during Yuan Dynasty, founded by the Mongolians, but regained its strength in Ming dynasty. Yuan dynasty showed an aversion against the Confucianist culture and scholars. Rather, they followed Lamaism, a school of Buddhism, and Quanzhen School of Taoism, and Saju was not accepted. This paper focuses on the social historical background of the acceptance of certain Saju theories (its major texts called the Five Classics) in Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties and further, in Koryo and Joseon dynasties.

‘Hyang-gyo(鄕校)’ is the Confucian temple and school to teach local students in the Joseon Dynasty period. It is the National Institutes of Confucian Education. There are two kinds of gates in ‘Hyang-gyo’. One is ‘Outer 3-door Gate(外三門)’ and the other is ‘Inner 3-door Gate(內三門)’. In general, each gate have 3 doors, many gates are decorated with various kinds of Taiji patterns. Today, there are (1) 234 ‘Hyang-gyo’, (2) 228 ‘Outer 3-door Gates(外三門)’，and (3) 230 ‘Inner 3-door Gates(內三門)’ left in Korea. Of the 458 Outer or Inner 3-door gates, 361 gates have many kinds of Taiji patterns. The results of the survey on the combined types of Taiji patterns on the total of 458 gates are as follows. First, the combined types of ‘Yin-Yang Taiji(陰陽太極, □)’ and ‘Sam-il Taiji三一太極：□, Three-in-one Taiji)' patterns were classified into 15 kinds of types. Second, among the 361 gates(excluding 97 gates without Taiji patterns), (1) the most common type is ‘Type 8’ which has ‘3 Yin-Yang Taiji’(196 gates, 42.79%), (2) ‘Type 13’ which has ‘1 Yin-Yang Taiji’ is the second one(77 gates, 16.81%), (3) and ‘Type 1’ which has ‘3 Sam-il Taiji’ is the third one(50 gates, 10.91%). Third, among the 361 gates, (1) 56 gates(15.51%) have ‘3 Sam-il Taiji’, (2) 67 gates(18.56%) have ‘only 1-3 Sam-il Taiji’, and (3) 83 gates(22.99%) have ‘any pattern with Sam-il Taiji’. Fourth, This situation shows that the Confucian scholars of the Joseon Dynasty clearly recognized and used the ‘Sam-il Taiji’ as a distinct symbol from the ‘Yin-Yang Taiji’. Fifth, among the 361 gates (excluding 97 gates without Taiji pattern), ⑴ 198 gates(54.85%) have ‘3 Yin-Yang Taiji’, (2) 276 gates(76.45%) have ‘only 1-3 Yin-Yang Taiji’, and (3) 247 gates(68.42%) have ‘any pattern with Yin-Yang Taiji’. Sixth, in terms of regions, the proportion of the ‘Yin-Yang Taiji’ is relatively high in Gyeonggi, Chungnam, Jeonbuk, and Kyungbu provinces. And the proportion of the ‘Sam-il Taiji’ is relatively high in Gangwon and Chungbuk provinces. In the end, ‘Sam-il Taiji’ and ‘Yin-Yang Taiji’ are coexisted on the gate of Hyang-gyo in Korea. And they were clearly distinguished as different symbols. Therefore, it is necessary to study ‘Sam-il Taiji’ in various fields which have not been studied in the past.

This paper aimed to examine if the discussion of intersectionality theory between German feminists about the unequal structure in multicultural society could become a theoretical frame to explain the multicultural phenomenon of Korean society. In the process, it paid attention to the complexity of inequality and the multiple structuralization of social inequality. This paper aiming to understand the unequal structure of Korean society which is multiculturalized as a ‘multi-layered hierarchy within the polarization’ through the intersectionality theory is in the context to understand the aspect of neo-patriarchal gender order's change under the ‘welfare regime’. Since 2001, with the establishment of the Ministry of Gender Equality, in the process of when women's policies are evolved to gender equality policies, as the formal idea of equality becomes a dominating social discussion, it is moved to the ‘flexible gender regime’. As one of the diverse socio-structural factors having effects on the change to this ‘flexible gender regime’ is the multicultural phenomenon, it examined the utility of the discussion of intersectionality theory performed in Germany, as a theoretical frame to explain the unequal structure of multicultural society in the extension of discussion of ‘flexile gender regime’. In the global era, it is not good enough to analyze the unequal structure through the controlling-controlled relationship based on class and sex in the aspect of classical sociology as we intersectionally face the multi-layered unequal structure. The intersectionality theory explains that society is polarized into inclusion and exclusion, and within the polarization, it is multilaterally crossing over.

As the polarization of society becomes more intense, the types of conflicts are expanded from the dimension of distribution to the dimension of recognition. The minority is the most obvious example of this change. The purpose of this study is to examine the dynamics of minority production in the area of conflicts in Korean society and to compare the discrimination levels of 25 regions(Gu) in Seoul. First of all, minority is produced in the domain of lack, inferiority, taste, and addiction in Korean society. It is confirmed that the production of minority is spreading beyond the economic dimension to the cultural dimension. In addition, among the 25 regions(Gu) in Seoul, the level of minority discrimination was the highest against alcoholics, transgenders and gamers. And, it is revealed that major conflicts in Korean society will be centered on addiction or taste. In more details, discrimination against people such as poor elderly, defectors, and welfare recipients appears to be higher in the poorer regions where foreign workers are concentrated. It is interpreted that the discrimination against the deficient group which was considered as the conflict between the rich and the poor is more prevalent in the lower class recently. On the other hand, regions with high cultural capital (Gangnam 3 gus) show higher levels of discrimination against the groups of inferior such as unmarried, obese, short guy. And also, the discrimination is higher against the groups based on tastes such as transgender, Otaku and gamer. This means that in the upper class, the boundaries between the adjacent groups are formed based on their appearance, body, and taste. The above results show that conflicts in Korean society represented by ‘Gab-eul’ relationship or the politics of loser are spreading in various directions within the class. It also shows that discrimination against ethnic minorities is created in this process. When such situational stratification is properly accommodated by the general public, discrimination and exclusion against them are structured. In a polarized society, in terms of minority peoples can be produced in all aspects of everyday life, the problem of discrimination against minorities needs to be transformed into a more fundamental level of recognitional justice beyond the management of conflicts.

“Gapjil,” arbitrary treatment for the weak, is “Doing with Power exclusively.” It is based on a certain belief that power is natural. “Euljil" not only accepts but also tries to adjust itself to unjust “Gapjil.” Both “Gapjil and “Euljil” involve practice of separating too severely, so they do not allow any bases of sharing anything. Those words, behaviors, meanings in everyday life that come to be reduced to “only me” or “only money,” will be internalized as natural process, and then constitute our ways of thinking and values. Indeed, “Gapjil” and “Euljil” come into being out of either half willingly (out of same way of thinking belonging to a single rule) or half not (out of belonging to separated and different material worlds). “Gapjil” is a condition of non-communication out of “only me” and “Euljil” is a condition of non-communication out of “only you.” By contrast, we can imagine “Byongjil” as a condition of communication in term of “you and me coming together.” Obviously, there is no Eul’s proper position in “Gapjil,” as it erases the proper distinction. This is the outcome not of “equalizing up to Gap’s material condition,” but of “coming to belong Gap’s rule.” Here “the more equalizing become more differentiated,” which then means the process that “the more being integrated become more separated condition.” Hence, the more spiritually equalized, it becomes more materially differentiated. Yet this also involves “the more being differentiated, it becomes equalizing.” All the process comes to reproduce vertical separation in our relations. “Good equality” is “horizontal equality” based on communication among “all human beings,” which is the equality that can be different. “Bad equality” is “vertical equality” based on arbitrary relations and non communication, which is conformability that cannot be different. By contrast, “Good Difference” is horizontal difference that is open and communicative, so it can lead toward diversities and creativities. Hence, differences here can come together. By contrast, “Bad Difference” is vertical difference that is discriminative and non communicative, so it can end up with polarization and discrimination. Accordingly, the difference here cannot come together. In sum, the horizontal difference is democratic and the vertical difference is non-democratic.

Despite our high educational achievements that the world praises, this study raises questions about the fact that Koreans are not happy and rather complain about our education system. The world has praised Korea’s education system because of 1) a high score in the test of PISA, 2) a country with the smallest score difference among students at different income levels, ie, a country with equal distribution of academic achievement, and 3) the expansion of educational opportunities, including the higher education levels achieved at an unprecedented pace. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the institutional system of education in Korea has been growing since 1990s. In order to understand this ironic situation, it is necessary to examine the dynamic changes of Korean society created by the unbalanced economic growth process that resulted in class differentiation and by democratization that brought about the dissolution of the authoritarian development state. To summarize, in the process of economic growth and political democratization, those who occupied the upper part of the Korean status hierarchy is expressing dissatisfaction with formal education system in Korea from their desperate desire to maintain or reproduce its position, and those who relatively less benefitted complain about educational opportunity and demand the education policy to redress the situation. In short, there is a problem of inequality in the Korean society that is getting worse at the center where the complaints about our education are expressed. Paradoxically, however, this situation ask us to abandon the existing view that education is a ladder of status mobility or a place where class conflicts arise. The class structure of Korean society has already been fixed, and it is not possible to do anything about the problem of class structure inequality through education. Because the attempt to solve this problem through education usually results in strong resistance of the ruling class and only causes a constant legitimacy struggle. On the contrary, what we urgently need to do about the education problem is to implement the suggestion of Toffler, who proposed a change that would replace the existing system as a whole, to an education system that cultivates diversity. Such a change in our education is an old future that has already arrived.

This study attempted a theoretical analysis of science and technology and public relations through comparison of two approaches to the public understanding of science (PUS). Since the 1980s, PUS has developed into the two branches of traditional PUS and constructive PUS, suggesting different assumptions and perspectives on the public, science, and understanding. While traditional PUS studies have influenced the popularization of science and technology, constructive PUS studies have influenced scientific democratization. Constructive PUS studies provide an important theoretical basis for he relationship between the public and science and technology and expand their theoretical and practical domains. Therefore, this study compared the traditional PUS and the constructive PUS with respect to theoretical characteristics and criticism. The study analyzed changes in the relationship between the public and science and technology through each of the PUS case studies. Also, it critically analyzed the theoretical and practical achievements of PUS, which have been discussed in Korean society, and inquired into the new challenge of democratization and transition to participatory governance.